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INTRODUCTION
OnJune 15, 1989, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. ' Motivated by the desire to recon-
sider its landmark ruling in Runyon v. McCray,2 the Court seized
upon a routine employment discrimination case as its vehicle.
Although the Court ultimately did not overrule its holding in Runyon
that 42 U.S.C. § 19813 provides a remedy for private discrimination,
its decision in Patterson appears to restrict severely the availability of
§ 1981 as a remedy for racially motivated employment
discrimination. 4
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, relied on the language of
§ 1981 that grants to all persons "the same right ... to make and
enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens," and con-
cluded that "the right to make contracts does not extend, as a matter
of either logic or semantics, to conduct by the employer after the
contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms
t B.S. 1988, Drexel University; J.D. Candidate 1991, University of Pennsylvania.
1 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
2 427 U.S. 160 (1976). For a discussion of Runyon, see infra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
3 Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
4 See Kamen, Landmark Rights Decision Narrowed: Court Ruling Will Hamper
Enforcement of Bias Laws, Opponents Say, Wash. Post, June 16, 1989, at Al, col. 4
(reporting claims of civil rights lawyers that Patterson will "severely curtail effective
enforcement of federal anti-discrimination laws"). According to an NAACP Legal
Defense Fund study, in less than five months following the Patterson decision, ninety-
six claims in fifty racial discrimination cases were dismissed by lower federal courts
because of the Court's decision. See Epstein, Fallout of a Civil-Rights Ruling: 96 Bias
Claims Dismissed Since June Decision, Phila. Inquirer, Nov. 20, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working conditions."
6
Because racial harassment occurs after the formation of the contract,
the Court concluded that it was not prohibited by § 1981, which it
interpreted to protect only against discrimination in the initial for-
mation of contracts. According to the Court, § 1981 would encom-
pass only a racially motivated refusal to enter into a contract or the
offering of discriminatory terms of employment.
Dissenting from this reasoning, Justice Brennan denounced the
Court majority's "pinched reading of the phrase 'same right to make
a contract.' "7 In his opinion, the words of § 1981 could be read to
extend to "postformation conduct that demonstrates that the con-
tract was not really made on equal terms at all."' Justice Brennan
also pointed to the fact that on thejob harassment would deter other
minority members from taking jobs with the offending employer,
impeding the right to contract free of discrimination. 9 In a separate
opinion, Justice Stevens also concluded that on the job harassment
should be covered by § 198 1O In his view, an at-will employee con-
stantly remakes her contract. Therefore, if an employer begins to
harass a minority employee after the employment relationship is
formed, such a practice prevents the minority employee from con-
tracting on the same terms as those enjoyed by "white citizens.""
Significantly, all three opinions rely on the clause of § 1981 that
protects the right to contract free of discrimination. Section 1981,
however, encompasses much more than that one provision. It was
designed as a comprehensive statute to secure civil rights for the
freed slaves. In responding to a question as to how he interpreted
the term civil rights, Senator Trumbull, the sponsor of the Act, did
not limit his answer to the protection of the right to enter into con-
tracts, but explained:
The first section of the bill defines what I understand to be civil
rights: the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued,
and to give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell, lease, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit to
all laws and proceedings For the security of person and property.
6 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
7 Id. at 2379 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8 Id. at 2389 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Brennan maintained that acts of harassment might be sufficiently severe "as
effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into in a racially neutral
manner." Id.
9 See id. at 2389 n.13 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
10 See id. at 2395 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
11 See id. at 2396 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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These I understand to be civil rights, fundamental rights belonging
to every man as a free man, and which under the Constitution as it
12now exists we have a right to protect....
Despite the broad list of rights enumerated in § 1981, Supreme
Court dicta to the effect that § 1981 on its face "relates primarily to
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts"
has affected dramatically the development of the statute."3 As a
result, most claims brought under § 1981 have alleged some type of
racial discrimination interfering with the right to contract.14
In construing § 1981, most courts have neglected its scope
beyond the prohibition of discrimination in contracts. The three.
largely ignored clauses are the evidence clause, which guarantees the
right "to sue, be parties, [and] give evidence"; the full and equal
benefit clause, which guarantees the right to the "full and equal ben-
efit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty"; and the like punishment clause, which guarantees the right to
"like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.""5 Although the Supreme Court has not
construed these clauses, a few lower courts have examined them to
some extent.
1 6
This Comment will explore the extent to which these largely
ignored clauses of § 1981 may be applied in employment discrimina-
12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866).
13 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975), quoted in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976). Indeed, the Patterson Court reiterated
this dicta, stating:
The most obvious feature of the provision is the restriction of its scope to
forbidding discrimination in the "mak[ing] and enforce[ment]" of
contracts alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve
the impairment of one of these specific rights, § 1981 provides no relief.
Section 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial
discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly prohibits
discrimination only in the making and enforcement of contracts.
Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372. This Comment seeks to show that such a restriction of
the scope of § 1981 solely to contractual relations was both unintended by the fram-
ers of the provision and contrary to a sound reading of the provision.
14 See, e.g., Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1975)
(dealings with mortuaries); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, 495 F.2d 1333, 1339
(2d Cir. 1974) (recreation facilities); Sims v. Order bf United Commercial Travelers,
343 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D. Mass. 1972) (the sale of insurance); United States v.
Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145, 152 (D.S.C. 1969) (admission to a hospital).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
16 See, e.g., Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1026-30 (3d Cir. 1977) (relying
on the full and equal benefit and like punishment clauses of § 1981), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 904 (1978); Clark v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 324 (E.D. Va.
1979) (relying on the full and equal benefit clause).
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tion contexts such as in Patterson. The Comment seeks a firmer foun-
dation within § 1981 for many of those protections previously, and
probably erroneously, provided under the contract clause of § 1981.
It concludes that although the Court's decision might be correct on
the narrow question of whether the contract clause of § 1981 was
meant to cover harassment and other postformation conduct, the
other clauses of § 1981 clearly provide many of the protections pre-
viously forced to fit the language of the contract clause.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, from which § 1981 is derived. Part II discusses
the application of § 1981 in the field of employment discrimination
prior to the decision in Patterson. Part III examines the decision
itself. Part IV traces the scanty development of the evidence, full and
equal benefit, and like punishment clauses in the lower federal
courts, with an emphasis on their application to private as opposed
to state conduct. Very little development of these clauses has
occurred in the area of employment discrimination, most likely
because of the broad range of behavior previously thought to be cov-
ered by the contract clause.
1 7
I. HISTORY OF SECTION 1981
A. Derivation
It is well established that the statute now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 traces its origins to the Civil Rights Act of 1866. t' The 1866
17 Congress may attempt to provide the protection taken away by the Court in
Patterson. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 seeks to overturn a number of
Court decisions, including Patterson. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S1019 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990). The eventual scope of this
proposed legislation is not yet clear. Should Patterson remain unaffected by the
proposed Act, or if the remedies allowed by any new legislation are inadequate, the
arguments proposed by this Comment would permit litigants to sue under § 1981 for
damages caused by discriminator) conduct after the formation of the employment
contract.
18 Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted as Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
114, 16 Stat. 140). As adopted, § 1 of the 1866 Act provided:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every
race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
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Act originally was adopted under the authority of the thirteenth
amendment;' 9 as a result of doubts concerning its constitutionality,
however, it was reenacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 187020
under the authority of the fourteenth amendment.
2'
Taking an action that would complicate further the interpreta-
tion of these Civil Rights statutes, Congress in 1866 passed an act to
provide for "the [r]edivision and [c]onsolidation of the [s]tatute laws
of the United States. ' 2 2 In 1874, Congress approved the statutes as
revised and passed an act to provide for their publication.23 As a
result of this revision, § 1981 appeared in its current form. The
reviser's note, however, indicated that § 1981 was derived solely
from the 1870 Act.2 4 The note failed to mention any derivation of
the section from the 1866 Act, enacted pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment. The failure to mention the derivation of the predeces-
sor of § 1981 from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had a significant
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
Note that § 1 of the Act contains the protections now codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1982), see supra note 3, as well as those in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982), which
provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property." Id. Because of their identical origins,
interpretation of one of the statutes often draws upon decisions under the other. See
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973) (concluding
that "[iln light of the historical interrelationship between § 1981 and § 1982, we see
no reason to construe these sections differently").
19 The thirteenth amendment provides: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII.
20 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
21 Section one of the fourteenth amendment provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74.
23 See Act ofJune 20, 1874, ch. 333, 18 Stat. 1090 app.
24 See Rev. Stat. § 1977 (1874).
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impact upon the scope of the statute. A statute enacted pursuant to
the fourteenth amendment could reach only behavior that could be
construed as state action.
25
In Runyon v. McCrary,26 the Supreme Court resolved the contro-
versy as to the correct derivation of § 1981:
It is ... most plausible to assume that the revisers omitted a refer-
ence to § 1 of the 1866 Act or § 18 of the 1870 Act either inadver-
tently or on the assumption that the relevant language in § 1 of the
1866 Act was superfluous in light of the closely parallel language in
§ 16 of the 1870 Act....
[T]here is ...no basis for inferring that Congress did not
understand the draft legislation which eventually became 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 to be drawn from both § 16 of the 1870 Act and § 1 of the
1866 Act.
To hold otherwise would be to attribute to Congress an intent
to repeal a major piece of Reconstruction legislation on the basis of
an unexplained omission ftom the revisers' marginal notes.
27
In concluding that § 1981 was derived from both the 1866 and 1870
Acts, the Court clearly demonstrated both the thirteenth and four-
teenth amendment origins of the statute. In so doing, the Court
established that the Act applied to private as well as state action.
2 8
B. Purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to effectuate the poli-
cies of the thirteenth amendment by covering a broad range of
behavior and providing the recently freed slaves with explicit protec-
tions from the entrenched racism of the South. As proclaimed by
Senator Trumbull, the objects of the bill were "to secure equal rights
to all the citizens of the country. . . [and] to break down all discrimi-
nation between black men and white men."2 9 Given the attempt to
25 For a case concluding that § 1981 was limited to state action, see Cook v.
Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d
1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
26 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon was not an employment discrimination case.
The parents of a group of black children who were denied admission to a private
school on the basis of their race brought suit. The Court concluded that because
§ 1981 applies to private conduct, the school's refusal to contract with black parties
constituted an actionable claim under the statute. See id. at 170-71.
27 Id. at 168-70 n.8.
28 See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text (concerning the earlier
developments indicating that the statute applies to private action).
29 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 599 (1866).
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provide a full battery of protections, it is ironic that the only clause of
§ 1981 to receive much attention concerns the right to make and
enforce contracts. The history of the 1866 Act that follows discusses
the diverse nature of the types of discriminatory behavior contem-
plated by those who drafted it.30 It attempts to establish that the Act
was not intended solely to prohibit discrimination in the formation
of contracts.
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the fourteenth amend-
ment were intended to remedy the problem of racial hostility in the
South."' Of particular concern were the Black Codes enacted by the
southern states, as well as the widespread acts of private discrimina-
tion and violence against the freed slaves. Eight southern states
enacted Black Codes in 1865 in response to the thirteenth amend-
ment.32 Although these Codes granted blacks certain rights, such as
the right to own property, the right to appear as a witness or party to
a suit, and the right to marry,3 3 they were in many respects just as
restrictive as the old Slave Codes.
3 4
30 The discussion is not meant to suggest that the problems of racial
discrimination the United States faces as it enters the 1990s are the same as those
faced immediately after the Civil War. Indeed, racial discrimination has become
much more subtle. Despite the increasingly subtle nature of racist attitudes,
however, "severe and difficult manifestations of both individual and institutional
racism remain a prominent part of American life." Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism:
The Diferent Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 673 (1985).
31 One commentator opines that widespread doubt about the adequacy of the
thirteenth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to solve the problems
engendered by emancipation led to the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. See
tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to
Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 200-02 (1951).
32 See C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE 110 (1971); see also E.
MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF
RECONSTRUCTION 29-44 (1875) (providing a summary of the southern states' freed
slaves' statutes).
33 See, e.g., Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper
Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE LJ. 541, 552 (1989) (enumerating the technical
freedoms that the Black Codes typically conferred on the freed slaves).
34 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Trumbull) (pointing to the similarities between the old Slave Codes and the new
Black Codes).
Common provisions of the Black Codes provided for segregation, forbade
intermarriage between blacks and whites, required special licenses for blacks to
engage in certain trades, provided special punishments for black vagrants and for
those who broke labor contracts, forbade blacks to own arms, and made it a criminal
offense for any person, white or black, to educate a former slave. See J. BLUM, E.
MORGAN, W. ROSE, A. SCHLESINGER, JR., K. STAMPP & C. WOODWARD, THE NATIONAL
EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 394 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter J.
BLUM]. In addition to the restrictive Codes established by the states, municipalities
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An even greater obstacle to integration than the Black Codes
was "the presence of pervasive and entrenched private discrimina-
tion"" in the South. To illustrate the pervasive private discrimina-
tion against the recently emancipated slaves, General Schurz
appended to his report to the President the proposal of a group of
Louisiana planters regarding the employment of black laborers. He
described the report as a "true representation[] of the ideas and sen-
timents entertained by large numbers to-day." 36 The proposal rep-
resented a general predisposition to deny dignity and autonomy to
the freed slaves.
This social attitude posed a much broader problem than could
be encompassed and remedied under the narrow legal protection of
the right to make contracts on the same terms as white persons. The
proposal provided that farm laborers were to work sixty hours a
week, and that the planters were to agree to a maximum wage to be
paid to black employees.3 7 These employees were not to leave the
plantation, nor could they receive visitors without the written per-
mission of the planter. Corporal punishment was prescribed "to cor-
rect any abuse,"3 8 and fines or imprisonment were to be imposed on
any laborers who were not "respectful in tone, manner, and lan-
guage to their employers."
39
In addition to this "peaceful" discrimination, the freed slaves
experienced widespread violence. Observing the violent social
results that followed the thirteenth amendment's abolition of slavery,
Major General Schurz stated in his report to President Johnson:
passed ordinances that severely restricted the freedom of blacks. Representative
provisions of one of these municipal ordinances were quoted by Major General Carl
Schurz in his report to the President on the condition of the South:
Section 3. No negro or freedman shall be permitted to rent or keep a
house within the limits of the town under any circumstances, and any one thus
offending shall be ejected and compelled tofind an employer or leave the town
within twenty-four hours. The lessor or furnisher of the house leased or
kept as above shall pay a fine often dollars for each offence. Section 4. No
negro or freedman shall reside within the limits of the town of Opelousas
[a town in Louisiana] who i not in the regular service of some while person or
former owner.Section 8. No freedman shall sell, barter or exchange, any
articles of merchandise or traffic within the limits of Opelousas without
permission in writing from his employer, or the mayor, or president of the
board.
S. EXEC. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong.. 1st Sess. 23 (1865) [hereinafter Schurz Report].
35 Sullivan, supra note 33, at 552.
36 Schurz Report, supra note 34, at 22.
37 See id. at 84.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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Not only the former slaveholders, but the non-slaveholding whites,
who, even previous to the war, seemed to be more ardent in their
pro-slavery feelings than the planters themselves, are possessed by
a singularly bitter and vindictive feeling against the colored race
since the negro has ceased to be property. The pecuniary value
which the individual negro formerly represented having disap-
peared, the maiming and killing of colored men seems to be looked
upon by many as one of those venial offenses which must be for-
given to the outraged feelings of a wronged and robbed people.
Besides, the services rendered by the negro to the national cause
during the war, which make him an object of special interest to the
loyal people, make him an object of particular vindictiveness to
those whose hearts were set upon the success of the rebellion. The
number of murders and assaults perpetrated upon negroes is very
40great...
General Schurz's statement makes it clear that Congress was
aware of the private atrocities being visited upon blacks in the period
before the adoption of the 1866 Act. Such awareness sheds some
light on the dispute as to whether or not the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was intended to reach private as well as state action.4 '
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was proposed and finally adopted
against this background of restrictive laws, private discrimination,
and violence. While introducing the bill, Senator Trumbull, its prin-
cipal author, stated that he regarded it as the most important matter
under consideration since the thirteenth amendment and continued:
This measure is intended to give effect to [the thirteenth amend-
ment] and secure to all persons within the United States practical
freedom. There is very little importance in the general declaration
of abstract truths and principles unless they can be carried into
effect, unless the persons who are to be affected by them have some
means of availing themselves of their benefits....
It is the intention of this bill to secure [these] rights.
42
Although the earliest court decisions under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 recognized that it was meant to secure "practical freedom"
for the freed slave, the hostility of the Supreme Court to civil rights
40 Id. at 20. General Schurz also reported witnessing a number of actual
murders and assaults perpetrated upon blacks, including a fatal stabbing of a black
on the streets in Atlanta and two assaults with apparent intent to kill upon blacks in
Montgomery. See id.
41 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173-75 (1976); see also infra notes 149-
53 and accompanying text (regarding the resuscitation of the state action argument
as applied to the full and equal benefit clause).
42 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1866).
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legislation soon severely limited the promise of the Act. The Act
would not obtain any practical significance until the Court's decision
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,43 more than a century after the Bill's
passage.
C. Early Court Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
The early circuit court. decisions interpreting the Civil Rights
Act took a broad view of the protections provided by the statute. For
example, in United States v. Rhodes,4 4 Supreme Court Justice Swayne,
on circuit duty, held that the prosecution of a Kentucky state official
who prevented a black woman from testifying was invalid under the
1866 Act. Similarly, in In re Turner,45 Supreme Court Justice Chase,
also on circuit duty, found that the 1866 Act required the release of a
black child apprenticed to her former owner the day after slavery was
declared illegal in Maryland. Finally, in United States v. Cruikshank,4 6
Justice Bradley cited the 1866 Act as an example of Congress's
power to "give full effect" to the thirteenth amendment's "bestow-
ment of liberty."'4 7 Notably, not one of these cases mentions the
power to contract. The cases view the 1866 Act as a broad proscrip-
tion of racial discrimination.
Despite the promising early interpretations of the 1866 Act, the
Court soon turned hostile to such civil rights issues. 48 The most sig-
43 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
44 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. K). 1866) (No. 16,151).
45 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). Significantly, in this case the
court looked to the full and equal benefit clause. Such an interpretation of the 1866
Act supports the Patterson Court's interpretation of the contract clause as applying
only to barriers to entering contracts because, in this case, the child was not
prevented from entering into a contract and the court did not look to the contract
clause. The court did, however, indicate that such an action violated the full and
equal benefit clause and that the scope of the statute as a whole extends far beyond
protection of the right to make and enforce contracts free of discrimination. See id.
46 25 F. Cas. 707 (C.C.D. La. 1874) (No. 14,897), aff'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
47 Id. at 711. Cruikshank itself did not involve the 1866 Act. In that case, Justice
Bradley dismissed an indictment under the 1870 Enforcement Act that charged a
group of whites with conspiring to lynch a group of blacks who had voted in the
previous election. The indictment was dismissed for failure to allege that racial
prejudice was the sole motivation of the conspiracy. In the course of upholding the
constitutionality of the 1870 Act, Justice Bradley cited the 1866 Act as an example of
Congress's power to give full effect to the thirteenth amendment. See id.
48 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (holding that the
"separate but equal" access to public accommodations had "no tendency to destroy
the legal equality of the two races or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude" and
did not violate either the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments), overruled, Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22,
24 (1883) (striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because the fourteenth
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nificant Supreme Court decision to limit the 1866 Act and the thir-
teenth amendment was Hodges v. United States.4 9 The indictment of
the defendants, who conspired to terrorize blacks and prevent them
from working in a sawmill, was based on sections 197750 and 550851
of the Revised Statutes. Overruling the District Court, which had
found a cause of action for conspiracy, the Court held that although
a freed slave is entitled to protection from assault and battery, "no
mere personal assault or trespass or appropriation operates to
reduce the individual to a condition of slavery." 52 Concluding that
"it was not the intent of the Amendment to denounce every act done
to an individual that was wrong if done to a free man and yet justified
in a condition of slavery,"53 the Court found further that any remedy
would have to be found in state law. As a result of Hodges, "which
condemned only the evils of chattel slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, litigation under the predecessor of § 1981 virtually came to a
halt."
54
amendment only applies to state action and the thirteenth amendment only applies
to "those fundamental rights that are the essence of civil freedom"); United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 641 (1883) (holding the conspiracy section of the 1871 Ku Klux
Act unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of the thirteenth amendment in
that the Act could be applied to whites as well as blacks and a color requirement was
required by the thirteenth amendment).
49 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441
n.78 (1968).
50 Rev. Stat. § 1977 (1874). Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes was the
predecessor of § 1981. Its text was identical to that of the current § 1981. For the
text of § 1981, see supra note 3.
51 Revised Statute § 5508, the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982), stated:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or
intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons
go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent
to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand
dollars and imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, moreover, be
thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
Rev. Stat. § 5508 (1874).
52 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 17-18.
53 Id. at 19.
54 Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
29, 64 (1980) (footnote omitted).
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D. Modern Iaterpretations of Section 1981
When the Court decidedJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,55 in 1968, a
viable action under § 1981 to combat modern forms of racial dis-
crimination became available for the first time. Jones concerned the
refusal of the defendants to sell a home to a black purchaser solely
because of his race. 56 The plaintiffs brought their claim under both
sections 1981 and 1982. The Court held "that § 1982 bars all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of prop-
erty, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the
power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. '5 7 The
Court reasoned that § 1982 was adopted pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment and that through its enabling clause, Congress had the
power to reach private acts of discrimination.58 In reaching this con-
clusion, the Court expressly overruled Hodges, noting the common
derivation of sections 1981 and 1982,"9 and criticizing Hodges as
"rest[ing] upon a concept of congressional power under the thir-
teenth amendment irreconcilable with the position taken by every
member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible with
the history and purpose of the Amendment itself."60
In holding that § 1982 applied to private conduct and reached a
broad range of discriminatory conduct, the Court in Jones revitalized
the 1866 Act. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 6 1 the Court guar-
anteed a broad reading of the Act by affirming a number of courts of
appeals that held, based upon Jones, that § 1981 affords a federal
remedy against racial discrimination in private employment.6 2 The
55 392 U.s. 409 (1968).
56 See id. at 412.
57 Id. at 413.
58 See id. at 439.
59 See id. at 442 n.78; see also supra note 18 (regarding the common derivation of
sections 1981 and 1982).
6o Jones, 392 U.S. at 442-43 n.78.
61 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Johnson concerned an action brought by a black
employee against his former employer and union for employment discrimination.
The employee had filed a claim tinder Title VII with the EEOC, and the question
before the Court was whether that filing had tolled the statute of limitations on a
claim based upon the identical facts that he brought in District Court pursuant to
§ 1981. The Court concluded that because Title VII and § 1981 offer distinct and
independent remedies, the filing under Title VII did not toll the limitations period
under § 1981. See id. at 466. This result has been criticized as forcing a plaintiff.with
claims possibly cognizable under both Title VII and § 1981 to file her § 1981 claims
in the adversarial forum of federal court before the reconciliatory efforts of the
EEOC have come to a close. See id. at 474 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
62 See id. at 459-60.
LOST CLA USES OF SECTION 1981
Court in Johnson concluded that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196463 and § 1981 provide independent causes of action for employ-
ment discrimination.64 This holding enabled a plaintiff in an
employment discrimination action to avoid many of the procedural
limitations of a Title VII lawsuit by suing under § 1981.65
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Title VII is that part
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 directed at discrimination in the workplace.
In relevant part, Title VII provides that:
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Ik- at § 2000e-2(a).
64 See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 461 (concluding that the remedies available under
Title VII and under § 1981, "although related, and although directed to most of the
same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent").
65 Compared to Title VII, § 1981 has a number of advantages. Under § 1981
remedies include unlimited backpay awards, see Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), and punitive damages when appropriate. See id. Title VII
limits backpay liability to two years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), and punitive damages are unavailable. See, e.g., Miller
v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 654 (5th Cir.) (disallowing
punitive damages under Title VII), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
Additionally, under § 1981, the plaintiff usually gains the advantage of a longer
statute of limitations than that available under Title VII. Because no specific statute
of limitations exists under § 1981, the courts look to the most analogous state statute
of limitations. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-62 (1987)
(stating that a wrong under § 1981 is a tort and should be governed by the state's
statute of limitations for personal injury claims). The periods allowed by most states
for the filing of a personal injury claim are longer than that allowed by Title VII. See,
e.g., Goodman, 482 U.S. at 662 (applying Pennsylvania's two-year statute). Under Title
VII, remedies provided by the EEOC must be exhausted and suits must be filed
within ninety days of the EEOC's issuance of a notice of a "right to sue." See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) to (0(l) (1982). Section 1981 does not require exhaustion of
the EEOC's remedies.
Ajury trial is available for claims under § 1981, but not under Title VII. See, e.g.,
Ward v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting the
distinction between legal claims under § 1981 and equitable claims under Title VII);
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1420 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
§ 1981 claims should be tried to a jury while the Title VII claim is tried
simultaneously to the judge).
Finally, Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982), while § 1981 has no such limitation. This limitation on
Title VII's coverage has a substantial impact on American employees' protection
from discrimination. It excludes about 10.7 million workers, constituting 14.4% of
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II. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER SECTION 1981
Before Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,66 § 1981 had become
extremely popular as an alternate remedy for employment discrimi-
nation.6 7 The popularity of the section for employment cases
resulted from the lower courts' recognition of a wide range of claims
under § 1981 regarding discrimination in hiring68 and firing.69 In
addition, courts had held that a large number of practices occurring
during the course of employment violated § 1981, including discrim-
the workforce, and 86.3% of all employers. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Importance of
Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 602 (1988). Before Patterson, excluded
employees could sue under § 1981.
Although fewer procedural requirements exist and greater damages are available
under § 1981 than under Title VII, the burden of proof under Title VII is less
stringent than under § 1981. A claimant under Title VII need not prove purposeful
discrimination; she only need prove that the procedure complained of has a
discriminatory impact on the group to which she belongs. See Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). A claimant under § 1981, however, must prove
purposeful discrimination. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375, 391 (1982). This difference means that under Title VII, a claimant need
only demonstrate that certain practices have a statistically disproportionate effect on
her group, but under § 1981, an actual intent to discriminate must be proven.
66 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
67 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 65, at 601. Eisenberg and Schwab studied
every § 1981 case filed in fiscal 1980-81 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (which
includes Philadelphia), the Central District of California (which includes Los
Angeles), and the Northern District of Georgia (which includes Atlanta). See id. at
598. Of the 252 cases studied, 195 (77%) consisted of employment claims. See id. at
601.
68 See, e.g., Sabol v. Snyder, 524 F.2d 1009, 1012 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that
the plaintiff had adequately proven racial discrimination under § 1981 when,
although the only qualified candidate, she was not hired).
69 See, e.g., Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 916 (8th Cir. 1986)
(finding sufficient evidence to support a verdict pursuant to § 1981 that an employee
was discriminatorily discharged); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277,
1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding sufficient evidence to support a verdict pursuant to
§ 1981 and Title VII that a bricklayer was discharged because of race); Long v. Ford
Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 506 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that the plaintiff could prevail
on a discharge claim if he could prove that his termination was based upon racial
prejudice). Note that termination for filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC or
filing a lawsuit under § 1981 has been found actionable. See, e.g., Choudhury v.
Polytechnic Inst., 735 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a cause of action under
§ 1981 when an employee was discharged for filing a claim with the EEOC); Goff v.
Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1982) (same).
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inatory promotions, 70 retaliation, 7 1 training,72 and harassment by
agents of the employer73 or by fellow employees.74
For the most part, courts allowing a cause of action for employ-
ment discrimination under § 1981 have relied upon the contract
clause. For instance, in Long v. Ford Motor Co., 75 a case involving dis-
criminatory training, promotion, and termination, the court held that
a plaintiff making a § 1981 claim must show that she "was unable to
make or enforce a contract that white citizens were able to make or
enforce. ' 76 Although restricting its decision to discrimination con-
cerning contractual relations, the court held that § 1981 encom-
passed discrimination in training, promotion, and termination,
because discrimination in these areas means that the employment
terms of minority employees differ from those of white employees.
77
.
70 See, e.g., Ramsey v. American Air Filter Co., 772 F.2d 1303, 1308-09 (7th Cir.
1985) (considering a failure to promote as evidence to prove actionable
discrimination under § 1981); Goff, 678 F.2d at 595-96 (considering a discriminatory
promotion claim under § 1981, but concluding that a prima facie case had not been
established); Long, 496 F.2d at 506 (recognizing that discriminatory promotion
practices are actionable under § 1981).
71 A retaliation claim may be made by a person who is not a member of the
minority group initially being discriminated against, but who upon defending the
minority from the discrimination suffers retaliation. See, e.g., DeMatteis v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir.) (allowing a cause of action for white man
forced into retirement allegedly for selling his house to a black buyer), modified, 520
F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1975); Cubas v. Rapid Am. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 663, 666-67 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (finding that white employees punished for supporting minority rights had
standing to sue under § 1981).
72 See, e.g., Long, 496 F.2d at 506 (holding that showing dissimilar training
resulting from racial distinctions would establish an actionable claim under § 1981).
73 See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding an
employer liable for a racial remark made to a black woman by a supervisor); Lucero v.
Beth Israel Hosp. & Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 452, 455 (D. Colo. 1979) (holding
an employer liable for racial harassment practiced by a black supervisor against
nonblack employees).
74 See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding an employer liable for racial slurs by his employees when he failed to use
reasonable care to discover what was going on and take remedial steps); Erebia v.
Chrysler Plastic Prods. Corp., 772 F.2d 1250, 1258 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding a
claim under § 1981 for a hostile work environment where management allowed
employees to subject Mexican-American supervisor to racial slurs), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1015 (1986).
75 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
76 Id. at 504.
77 See id. at 505-06. A similar result was obtained in Hunter, a case involving
harassment directed at a black employee, in which the court focused solely on the
contractual rights protected by § 1981. See Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1420 (in highlighting
what it felt to be the relevant portion of § 1981, the court only cited the contract
clause). Although not explicitly explaining how the racially motivated harassment
constituted an infringement upon the black employee's right to contract for
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Patterson rejected such logic; however, a careful analysis of the
three neglected clauses of § 1981 will demonstrate that these clauses
support causes of action that- should be recognized under § 1981. In
Patterson, the only language before the court concerned the right to
contract free of discrimination. As a result, the Court did not have
the opportunity to analyze the remaining clauses. These remaining
clauses should be read to prohibit postformation behavior such as
harassment.
III. PATTERSON V. MCLEAN CREDIT UNION
A. Background
Having discussed the history and importance of § 1981, it is
time to examine Patterson itself. Brenda Patterson was a black teller
at the McLean Credit Union from May 5, 1972 until July 19, 1982,
when she was laid off. 78 According to her testimony, Robert Steven-
son, McLean's president, told her when he hired her "that the other
women in the office, who were white, probably would not like her
because she was black."-
79
Patterson alleged in her complaint that she suffered discrimina-
tory harassment during her ten years of employment at McLean.
Among her claims, she alleged that, unlike the white clerical workers,
she was assigned to dust arid sweep the office.8" She claimed that
Stevenson periodically stared at her for several minutes at a time,
and that white clerical employees were not subjected to such scru-
tiny.8 1 Furthermore, when white employees made mistakes, she
employment, the court concluded that §-1981 afforded a remedy for such racial
harassment. See id. at 1421 (holding that the failure of an employer to take
reasonable steps to prevent racist attacks could lead to liability under § 1981). The
court seemed to rely on the simple syllogism that § 1981 covers employment
discrimination under the contract clause, see id. at 1420, that the failure of the
employer to act against harassment is employment discrimination, and therefore
§ 1981 covers discriminatory harassment. The Court in Patterson lashed out against
this tendency to ignore the plain meaning of the statute's wording. The fact that the
right to contract free from discrimination covers some types of employment
discrimination does not mean that it covers all types of discrimination. How such
harassment affects the ability to contract may be unclear, but this behavior does
implicate more clearly the full and equal benefit clause. See infra notes 164-85 and
accompanying text.
78 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
79 Id. at 1145.
80 See Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct.
2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
81 See id.
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claimed they were counselled in private while she was criticized by
name in group staff meetings.82 Patterson also claimed that her work
load was far in excess of that of her white co-workers and that when
she complained to Stevenson, he replied: "'Well, blacks are known
to work slower than whites by nature.' "83
In addition to these general acts of harassment, Patterson
claimed that she discriminatorily was denied a promotion. Susan
Williamson, a white woman, was hired in 1974 as an accountant jun-
ior and "promoted" in 1982 into the job of accountant clerk inter-
mediate.84 Patterson claimed that she was more qualified for this job
than Williamson because she was a college graduate and had more
seniority than Williamson. 5 In addition, Patterson claimed that she
was denied the on-the-job training given to Williamson. 6 Finally,
on July 19, 1982, Patterson was laid off. She claimed that white
employees with less experience were retained. 7
The United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina held, despite the overwhelming precedent of Courts of
Appeals, 8 that "a claim for racial harassment is not cognizable
under § 1981, and refused to submit that claim to the jury. ' 89 The
court did submit Patterson's claims of discriminatory promotion and
subsequent layoff to the jury;90 however, it instructed the jury, how-
ever, that to prevail on the promotion claim, the plaintiff had to
prove that she was more qualified for the position than Susan Wil-
liamson."' Given these instructions, the jury returned a verdict for
the defendant.92
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
82 See id.
83 Id. at 6, 7.
84 See id. at 10-11. Although Patterson characterized the action taken with
regard to Williamson as a promotion, the status of this action is far from clear. In
fact, the Court of Appeals concluded that the change with respect to Williamson was
merely a title change from "Account Junior" to "Account Intermediate." See
Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
85 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 11.
86 See id.
87 See id. at 12-13.
88 Of the thirty-two cases of racial harassment in employment to reach the
United States Courts of Appeals between 1971 and 1987, twenty-two discussed
§ 1981 and all concluded that it should apply to such conduct. See Sullivan,
Countervailing Activism? Employment Case Evokes Supreme Court Crisis, 24 GONZ. L. REV.
31, 31-32 (1988-89).
89 Patterson, 805 F.2d at 1145.
90 See id. at 1143.
91 See id. at 1147.
92 See id. at 1145.
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Circuit affirmed the District Court.9 3 It held that § 1981 covers
racial discrimination only in hiring, firing, and promotion because
those matters "go to the very existence and nature of the employ-
ment contract." 94 Racial harassment, according to the court, only
implicated the terms and conditions of employment and as such
should be actionable only under Title VII.95 Furthermore, the court
held that "once an employer has advanced superior qualification as a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for favoring another employee
over the claimant, the burden of persuasion is upon the claimant to
satisfy the trier of fact that the employer's proffered reason is pretex-
tual, that race discrimination is the real reason."
96
B. The Supreme Court Decision
After the Court of Appeals ruling, the two questions before the
Supreme Court were: 1) whether § 1981 encompassed a claim for
racial harassment and 2) whether the district court had erred in
instructing the jury that the plaintiff, Brenda Patterson, had the bur-
den in her discriminatory promotion claim to prove that she was
more qualified than the person who received the job.97 After argu-
ment on these issues, however, the Court ordered reargument on the
issue of whether Runyon v. McCray 98 should be overruled.9 9
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, determined that Run-
yon should not be overruled, and reaffirmed that § 1981 applied to
private behavior. In declining to overrule Runyon, the Court recog-
nized that, in statutory construction, the doctrine of stare decisis has
considerable impact."' 0 It recognized that because no special con-
siderations were present in the Patterson case, stare decisis should be
93 See id. at 1147-48.
94 Id. at 1145. Harassment, according to the Fourth Circuit, could only be used
as evidence of the discriminatory intent required to be shown in an action under
§ 1981. See id.
95 See id. at 1145-46.
96 Id. at 1147.
97 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at i; Brief for Respondent at i, Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989) (No. 87-107).
98 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (holding that § 1981 reaches private conduct).
99 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617, 617 (1988) (ordering
reargument).
100 See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370; see also Farber, Statutory Interpretation,
Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2, 8-14 (1988) (arguing that in
cases of statutory construction, there are strong public policy considerations that
militate in favor of applying stare decisis even if the original judicial interpretation
was contrary to the original intention of the legislature).
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given its normal effect and Runyon should not be overruled.' 0 1 In
conclusion, the Court stated that the holding in Runyon was "not
inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this country." 102
Having concluded that § 1981 applies to private conduct, the
Court proceeded to consider the scope of § 1981. Solely consider-
ing its contractual aspects,10 3 the Court concluded that "[s]ection
1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of racial discrim-
ination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly prohibits
discrimination only in the making and enforcement of contracts." 1
04
The Court interpreted the § 1981 right to make contracts on the
same terms as white persons very literally so as to apply only to dis-
crimination in the initial formation of the contract. The Court con-
cluded that, as "a matter of... logic or semantics," the terms of the
contract clause could only extend to the initial formation of con-
tracts.' 05 This interpretation of the contract clause could be consid-
ered incorrect for a number of reasons;'0 6 it is certainly possible,
however, that the Thirty-ninth Congress, in choosing the words
"right... to make.., contracts" did mean to protect only the right
101 See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2370-71. Although the Court did not overrule
Runyon, it did not embrace its reasoning.
102 Id. at 2371.
103 The parties themselves neglected the other protections of § 1981. For
instance, Patterson, the party who would have been expected to raise the issue of the
broad protection of § 1981, completely neglected the other clauses of § 1981. Her
brief is predicated on the principle that "[r]acial discrimination in the terms and
conditions of employment, including racial harassment and salary discrimination,
interferes with the right to make and enforce contracts and discourages the exercise
of this protected right." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 80, at 19. The petitioner's
brief does not mention that such racial harassment might constitute a deprivation of
the "full and equal benefit of the laws" pursuant to § 1981. For a discussion of the
elements of this potential claim, see infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text
(discussing discriminatory harassment as a violation of the full and equal benefit
clause).
104 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372.
105 Id. at 2373.
106 Justice Brennan, taking a different view of the language of § 1981, argued
that the language "is quite naturally read" to cover postformation conduct. Id. at
2388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his opinion, if
harassment is so pervasive as to "belie any claim that the contract was entered into in
a racially neutral manner," § 1981 should provide a cause of action. Id. at 2389
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens concluded,
also by examining the language of the statute, that because an at-will employee
constantly is remaking her contract, it is difficult to label any particular conduct as
being postformation; therefore, racial harassment should be covered by § 1981. See
id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, although the Court
majority states that logic and semantics can dictate no other result, Justices Brennan
and Stevens, relying on the same language, clearly do reach other results.
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to enter into non-discriminatory contracts. Accepting the Court's
interpretation of the contract clause, the remaining clauses of § 1981
clearly were meant to protect much more than the right to enter non-
discriminatory contracts. These clauses encompass the types of
postformation conduct that the Court concluded could not fall under
the contract clause.
1 0 7
Recognizing that the contract clause also includes the right to
enforce contracts, the Court concluded that such a right should be
interpreted narrowly and did not provide any protection to Patter-
son. According to the Court, the enforcement right only "embraces
protection of a legal process, and of a right of access to legal process,
that will address and resolve contract-law claims without regard to
race." '0 ' The Court did note that private actions impeding access to
the legal process would be actionable under § 1981.109
107 It would also appear, according to the Court's general rule, that a
discriminatory promotion would not be covered by § 1981; Patterson does, however,
allow certain discriminatory promotion suits to be brought under § 1981. For
example, a promotion involving a change in position allowing an opportunity to
enter into a new contract is still actionable under the contract clause. See id. at 2377.
As to exactly when a promotion would involve an opportunity to enter into a new
contract, the Court provided no guidance. Courts already have encountered the
difficulty in applying such a rule. See, e.g., Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305,
1311-12 (7th Cir. 1989) (presenting two alternate approaches with regard to
determining when a promotion rises to the level of a new contract). The Court in
Patterson reversed the Fourth Circuit on this issue, holding that it was improper for
the District Court to have instructed the jury that the only way for the plaintiff to
make out her discriminatory promotion claim would be for her to prove that she was
better qualified than the white woman who was promoted. The Court felt that the
plaintiff should be free to use a number of other forms of evidence including, in the
Patterson case, the instances of harassment and the employer's failure to train. See
Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2378-79.
108 Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
109 As support, the Court cited Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656
(1987), a case involving a challenge under § 1981 to a union's discrimination in
failing to challenge a company's discriminatory practices. In Goodman, the Court did
not make clear that it was relying on § 1981's guarantee regarding the enforcement
of contracts. The Patterson Court, however, used this case as an example of private
conduct that could interfere with access to legal process, in that the union's failure to
file the grievance deprived black workers of access to the grievance procedure in the
collective bargaining agreement. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
This part of the contract clause, although not protecting any postformation
conduct in Patterson, does have the potential to protect at least one type of
postformation conduct. As already noted, prior to Patterson, some courts had
construed § 1981 to reach discharges in retaliation for filing a lawsuit or for filing a
claim with the EEOC. See supra note 69. Such retaliatory conduct clearly impedes
access to the judicial process, for it forces the plaintiff to choose between filing suit or
a charge with the EEOC and continuing to work subject to discrimination. An
employer's activity of this sort is certainly private discrimination impeding access to
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C. The Contract Clause after Patterson
The Court's decision in Patterson severely restricts the protection
afforded by the contract clause of § 1981. According to the Court, a
person is only denied the opportunity to contract if someone refuses
to contract with her because of her race or only contracts with her on
terms inferior to those offered to whites. "O Under the Court's inter-
pretation, these unequal terms must be expressly set forth by the
employer at the beginning of the contract. The fact that the
employee was harassed after accepting the job does not mean that at
the time of contracting, the employer offered unequal terms to the
potential employee.' Courts applying Patterson have already dis-
missed a large number of § 1981 claims that they have found to be
for actions occurring after the formation of the contract.1 12 Aside
from harassment claims similar to those brought in Patterson itself,1 13
lower courts have also dismissed claims involving discriminatory
1 14
and retaliatory" 5 discharges as involving postformation conduct not
covered by § 1981.
legal process because, by potentially depriving a plaintiff of a job, it limits her ability
to prosecute successfully any action against the employer.
110 Cf Runyon, 427 U.S. at 164-65 (holding that a private school violated § 1981
by refusing to admit black students).
111 See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2376-77. Justice Brennan would have concluded
that harassment would be actionable under the contracts clause if the harassment
were sufficiently severe to indicate that the contract was not entered into in a racially
neutral manner. See id. at 2389 (Brennan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The only recognition that the majority gives to racial harassment is to allow it
to be used as evidence that the divergence in the explicit terms of particular contracts
is explained by racial animus. See id. at 2376.
112 See supra note 4.
113 See, e.g., Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 883 F.2d 475,
479 (6th Cir. 1989) (concluding pursuant to Patterson that there can be no § 1981
claim for racial harassment within a hostile working environment); Conley v.
University of Chicago Hospital, 52 EmpI. Prac. Guide (CCH) 39,465 (N.D. Ill. July
13, 1989) (ordering dismissal of the plaintiff's claim on the basis of Patterson because
it only involved discrimination in the course of employment).
114 See, e.g., Hall v. County of Cook, 719 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Ill. 1989) (holding
that a discharge from employment is not actionable under § 1981). But see Padilla v.
United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989). In Padilla, the court found that a
discriminatory discharge was actionable under § 1981 because:
[T]ermination is part of the making of a contract. A person who is
terminated because of his race, like one who was denied an employment
contract because of his race, is without a job. Termination affects the
existence of the contract, not merely the terms of its performance. Thus,
discriminatory termination directly affects the right to make a contract
contrary to § 1981.
Id. at 490.
115 See, e.g., Overby v. Chevron USA, Inc., 884 F.2d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1989)
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IV. THE LOST CLAUSES
Most of the employment cases discussed have relied upon the
contract clause of § 1981. IF they do not implicate the initial forma-
tion of the contract, they apparently are overruled by Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union. 116 Such a result, however, is not consistent with
the comprehensive nature of the rights guaranteed by § 1981. The
evidence clause, the full and equal benefit clause, and the like pun-
ishment clause may apply to much of the behavior that the Court has
found to be outside the scope of the contract clause. In this respect,
the Court's holding in Patterson allows lower courts to recognize a
broader range of discriminatory behavior under § 1981 than would
appear actionable if an application of this holding did not distinguish
among the various clauses of § 1981.
As a preliminary matter, it might be argued that § 1981 only
applies to contractual relations. Certain Supreme Court dicta could
be read to indicate that § 1981 only protects the right to make and
enforce contracts.' 17 Such dicta cannot be accepted at face value, for
(finding that, because a retaliatory discharge relates to postformation conduct, it is
not actionable under § 1981). But see Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1313
(7th Cir. 1989) (maintaining that a claim for retaliatory discharge might survive
Patterson).
Some cases prior to Patterson might not have relied solely on the contract clause.
They may have adopted implicitly the argument urged by this Comment that the
other clauses of § 1981 protect many types of discriminatory behavior. These cases,
because they did not specify the clause being applied, may not have been overruled
by Patterson. See, e.g., Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th
Cir. 1985) (finding that § 1981 provides a cause of action for a hostile work
environment without specifying a particular clause of § 1981), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1015 (1986). In Strozier v. General Motors Corp., 442 F. Supp 475, 480 (N.D. Ga.
1977), appeal dismissed, 584 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'dpercuriam, 635 F.2d 424 (5th
Cir. 1981), the court stated that:
Accordingly, because the essence of the plaintiff's allegations herein is
that he has been denied equal treatment in his employment with the
defendant because of his race, the court concludes that merely because
certain of plaintiff's section 1981 claims would be characterized as claims
founded upon retaliatory discrimination under Title VII, they should not
be dismissed as not cognizable under section 1981.
Id. The Strozier court recognized that § 1981 protection was more than just a protec-
tion of the right to contract. It speaks of a denial of "equal treatment," thereby rely-
ing upon something more than just the contract clause.
116 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
117 See id. at 2372 ("The most obvious feature of the provision is the restriction
of its scope to forbidding discrimination in the 'mak[ing] and enforce[ment]' of
contracts alone."); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) (stating that § 1981
"'relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of
contracts'" (quotingJohnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975))).
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to do so would "reduce the bulk of the statute to 'meaningless phra-
seology.' "118 Indeed, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 110 in which
the Court first stated that "Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .... on its face
relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforce-
ment of contracts," 120 the use of the word "primarily" indicates
some recognition of protection that reaches beyond the right to
make and enforce contracts.
12 1
In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 122 a case cited with approval by the
majority in Patterson, 123 the modern Court explicitly recognized that
the scope of § 1981 extends beyond mere protection of the right to
enter into contracts. The Court stated:
Section 1981 has a much broader focus than contractual rights.
The section speaks not only of personal rights to contract, but per-
sonal rights to sue, to testify, and to equal rights under all laws for
the security of persons and property; and all persons are to be sub-
ject to like punishments, taxes, and burdens of every kind. Section
1981 of the present Code was § 1977 of the Revised Statutes of
1874. Its heading was and is "Equal rights under the law" and is
contained in a chapter entitled "Civil Rights."... It is thus part of a
federal law barring racial discrimination, which, as the Court of
Appeals said, is a fundamental injury to the individual rights of a
person. 124
118 Spriggs v. City of Chicago, 523 F. Supp 138, 146 (N.D. Il1. 1981) (quoting
Rafferty v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045, 1062 (D. Md. 1976)).
119 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
120 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
121 Early court interpretations of the predecessors of § 1981 also indicate a
reach beyond the mere making of contracts. See supra notes 44-47. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), refutes a narrow reading of § 1981 that would apply
the section solely to claims regarding the making of contracts. In that case, the Court
held that Revised Statutes § 1977, the predecessor of § 1981, guaranteed blacks the
right to be tried before a jury that had not been selected in a racially discriminatory
manner. See id. at 309. In the words of the District Court in Spriggs v. City of
Chicago, 523 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ill. 1981), the holding in Strauder "simply cannot be
squared with a 'contracts only' interpretation" of § 1981. Id. at 146.
122 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
123 See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373.
124 Goodman, 482 U.S. at 661. Goodman concerned a suit brought by a group of
employees of a steel manufacturer against their employer and collective-bargaining
agents. They claimed that their employer had discriminated against minority
employees and that the union had failed to challenge such actions through grievance
procedures. See id. at 659-60. The issue decided by the Court concerned the
appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to § 1981 claims. The Court held
that because the scope of § 1981 is broader than a mere protection of contractual
rights, the state's statute of limitations for contract actions should not apply to claims
brought under § 1981. See id. at 661-62.
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The Court has recognized that § 1981 protects much more than the
right to contract. In the post-Patterson era, other sources of protec-
tion within § 1981 must be used.
As a result of the broad interpretations given to the contract
clause, courts have not paid much attention to the other clauses of
§ 1981. A few lower courts, however, have recognized that the pro-
tections of § 1981 do extend beyond the protection of the right to
make and enforce contracts. Although many of these decisions do
not deal with employment discrimination, the principles developed
in these cases apply with equal force in an employment context
resembling Patterson.
A. The Evidence Clause
The evidence clause guarantees the right to "sue, be parties,
[and] give evidence" against abridgement on the basis of race.
125
Although directed against laws and official misconduct that restrict
the right to sue and give evidence,' 26 the clause also clearly applies
to private actions that restrict the right to use the judicial process.
In a common private situation an employer retaliates against an
employee who brings a discrimination suit. 12 7 Title VII expressly
prohibits such conduct,'128 which was generally recognized as action-
able under § 198 1.129 Given Patterson's holding, it is less clear
whether such results are still justified under the contract clause.'
3 0
The evidence clause, however, clearly addresses such behavior.
If an employer, who has complete control over the employee's eco-
nomic situation, may retaliate against the employee's filing of a law-
suit with harassment or discharge of that employee, the employee's
ability to take legal action -clearly is impaired.
125 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
126 One of the original purposes of the evidence clause was to outlaw the state
laws passed following the Civil War that prevented blacks from suing or testifying in
court. For example, in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866)
(No. 16,151), a black woman was denied the right to testify against a white man who
had burglarized her home. After retrial by a federal court, the circuit court sustained
the guilty verdict on the basis of the evidence clause of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
127 In a less common situation, the claim brought by the employee is unrelated
to discrimination, for example a negligence claim, and the employer retaliates with
racial discrimination. See Comment, supra note 54, at 124-25.
128 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1982).
129 See supra note 69.
130 But see supra note 109 (regarding the coverage of retaliation by the
enforcement provision of the contract clause).
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Only one case expressly discusses the evidence clause as prohib-
iting retaliation. In Pennsylvania v. Local 542, International Union of
Operating Engineers, '3 ' the plaintiffs sued a union on the grounds that
it had embarked on a course of violence and harassment to keep the
plaintiffs from pursuing an employment discrimination suit.1 3 2 The
suit occurred in two phases. In the first phase, the union was
accused of racial discrimination. The second phase concerned the
union's retaliation against the original plaintiffs for having brought
the suit. Recognizing that § 1981 had origins that could be traced to
both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments, Judge Higginbot-
ham ruled that it applied to private as well as state action 3 3 and that
private acts such as those of the union could "abridge the fundamen-
tal rights of all free men,-the rights 'to sue, be parties, [and] give
evidence, ... .' freely and without violence or intimidation."'
' 3 4
The various clauses of § 1981 overlap in several significant
131 347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
132 See id. at 271-72.
133 See id. at 296-98.
134 Id. at 298. Local 542 is the only case to have discussed retaliation as a
violation of the evidence clause, as well as the only case to have dealt with the
applicability of the clause to private conduct. Although no cases indicate that the
evidence clause should only be applied to state conduct, arguments similar to those
raised by some courts with regard to the full and equal benefit and like punishment
clauses might be raised to impose a state action requirement on the evidence clause.
See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text. For instance, an argument conceivably
could be constructed based upon the proposition that because the state is
responsible for the conduct of trials, the only impairment of the right to present
evidence intended to be covered by the evidence clause is that of persons acting
under color of state law such as prosecutors and police investigators.
Such an argument, however, completely ignores the proposition asserted by this
Comment that private action may be just as effective in restricting an individual's
access to the judicial process as state action. The court in Local 542 adopted this
second proposition when it determined that an action under the evidence clause
should exist against private individuals or organizations which interfere with the right
to "sue, be parties, [and] give evidence." Local 542, 347 F. Supp. at 298.
The Local 542 decision of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania preceded the
Third Circuit's decision in Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). Although Mahone did not discuss the evidence clause, its
reasoning would appear to apply to the evidence clause as well as to the full and
equal benefit and like punishment clauses and might therefore call the validity of
Local 542 into question. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. Note,
however, that a further argument for extending the evidence clause to cover private
infringements concerns the proposition urged by various commentators that the
right to give evidence is a key to enforcing the other rights guaranteed by § 1981.
See, e.g., Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12
Hous. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1974); Comment, supra note 54, at 124-25. Because the
contract clause has already been established as applicable to private conduct, to
ensure this right, it is necessary for the evidence clause to apply to private conduct as
well. See id. at 125.
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respects. For example, the Supreme Court explained in Patterson
that its decision in Goodman was premised upon the right of employ-
ees to enforce their contracts through the legal process., 35 Taking
this characterization of Goodman as accurate, the enforcement aspect
of the contract clause and the evidence clause overlap.
Such overlap is apparent with the other clauses of § 1981 as
well. For instance, both the full and equal benefit and like punish-
ment clauses are often implicated in the police misconduct cases.'
36
Furthermore, an expansive reading of the full and equal benefit
clause could include the other rights guaranteed by § 1981. It is not
surprising that such overlap exists among the various clauses of
§ 1981; the statute was intended to be a comprehensive guaranty of
civil rights.' 37 Congress, intending to insure broad protection, may
not necessarily have been concerned with limiting overlap. In fact,
such overlap may be desirable to prevent any actions from slipping
between the available protections.'
38
135 See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373. It is with respect to this overlap between the
enforcement aspect of the contract clause and the evidence clause that the Patterson
Court made its only recognition of the other clauses of § 1981. Quoting Justice
White's dissent in Runyon, the Court stated that:
[Olne cannot seriously "contend that the grant of the other rights
enumerated in § 1981 [that is, other than the right to "make" contracts,]
i.e., the rights 'to sue, be parties, give evidence,' and 'enforce contracts'
accomplishes anything other than the removal of legal disabilities to sue,
be a party, testify or enforce a contract. Indeed, it is impossible to give
such language any other meaning."
Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2373, (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 195 n.5
(1976) (White, J., dissenting)). The precise meaning of this statement is quite diffi-
cult to ascertain. It could mean that with regard to the enforcement right and the
evidence clause, there must be some involvement of legal process. If, however, it
means that all of the other clauses must involve the legal process in some way, it is
untenable. Although the Thirty-ninth Congress was indeed interested in preventing
the impairment of the right of access to the legal process, it was also concerned with a
broad range of behavior other than that involving access to the legal process. See
supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text. The language of the full and equal benefit
and like punishment clauses does not indicate any contemplation of involvement of
the legal process.
136 See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
137 See supra notes 29-43 and accompanying text (regarding the broad purposes
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
138 Such an approach was taken when Congress refused to make Title VII the
exclusive remedy for employment discrimination by preserving a § 1981 cause of
action in employment cases. Se' 118 CONG. REC. 3367-73 (1972) (rejecting an
amendment that would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment
discrimination because, with regard to civil rights legislation, the protection provided
by the presence of some overlap was desirable).
LOST CLA USES OF SECTION 1981
B. The Full and Equal Benefit Clause
1. General Scope of the Full and Equal Benefit Clause
The full and equal benefit clause is perhaps the most far reach-
ing clause of § 1981. Like the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, it constitutes a broad grant of equality.
139
Unlike the equal protection clause, however, an accurate interpreta-
tion of the scope of the clause should not impose a state action
requirement because it was enacted under the authority of the thir-
teenth amendment.1
40
The most common use of the full and equal benefit clause has
been as a remedy for police misconduct. 4 ' In Mahone v. Waddle,'42
the plaintiffs brought a claim alleging that police officers "motivated
by racial bias, verbally and physically abused them, falsely arrested
them, and gave false testimony against them."'143 The court con-
cluded that "the facts alleged [fell] within the broad language of both
the equal benefits and like punishment clauses of § 1981."
14 4
Although the issue has not been before the Supreme Court, other
lower courts considering the issue also have concluded that the full
and equal benefit and like punishment clauses of § 1981 extend to
police misconduct.
4 1
The police misconduct cases stand for the proposition that har-
assment and discriminatory treatment of individuals on the basis of
their race violates the full and equal benefit clause of § 1981. Such
139 For the text of section one of the fourteenth amendment, see supra note 21.
140 See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
141 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 65, at 601 (stating that police
misconduct cases constitute approximately 11.5% of the cases brought under § 1981
and that those cases implicate the full and equal benefits and like punishment clauses
of § 1981).
142 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978).
143 Id at 1028.
144 Id.
14s See, e.g., Mendez v. Rutherford, 687 F. Supp. 412, 416 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
("Racially-motivated arrests, beatings and searches made in the absence of probable
cause easily fall within the wording of § 198 ."); Spriggs v. City of Chicago, 523 F.
Supp. 138, 146-47 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding that a claim of racially motivated police
brutality "fit[s] comfortably within the statute's literal boundaries"); Jones v. City of
Philadelphia, 491 F. Supp. 284, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (stating that the full and equal
benefit and like punishment clauses apply to police misconduct); Milburn v Girard,
441 F. Supp 184, 187-88 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (stating that the plaintiff's claim that he was
beaten by policemen because of his race sufficiently set forth a claim under § 1981);
Rafferty v. Prince George's County, 423 F. Supp. 1045, 1062 (D. Md. 1976) (finding
that "racially motivated detention, interrogation, and investigation by police officers"
is covered by § 1981).
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treatment deprives minorities of the equality promised by the clause.
Although there is a split in authority as to whether the full and equal
benefit clause applies to private conduct, 14 6 the history and language
of the statute clearly indicate that § 1981 extends to private conduct.
Many discriminatory acts against employees should therefore be cov-
ered by the full and equal benefit clause. If the full and equal benefit
clause covers police harassment, it should also extend to harassment
by one's employer, such as that which occurred in Patterson. Not all
of the police misconduct cases involved physical abuse, strengthen-
ing the analogy. In Rafferty v. Prince George's County, 147 for example,
the misconduct complained of and held actionable under the full and
equal benefit clause was not. brutality, but the discriminatory investi-
gation of a fire that killed the three children of the plaintiffs, an inter-
racial married couple. The District Court sustained on a motion to
dismiss a claim for the "extreme emotional distress" of an investiga-
tion predicated upon racial malice.
4 8
2. The State Action Problem
In cases seeking damages under the full and equal benefit clause
for police brutality, state action is not an issue because the police are
clearly officers of the state. When employees seek damages for dis-
crimination by private employers, however, the issue of state action
becomes important.' 49 Despite its clear and repeated holdings that
§ 1981 applies to private actions when the contract clause is impli-
cated,' -5 the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of
whether the remaining clauses apply to private action. No indication
has ever been given that the holdings of the Court were meant to
apply solely to the contract clause; however, in light of the fact that
courts have not analyzed in any depth the protections afforded by
these clauses, an absence of such a distinction cannot be regarded as
dispositive.
In fact, Mahone, perhaps the leading case establishing that the
protection of § 1981 extends beyond the right to contract, specifi-
cally concluded that state action was required for a violation of the
146 See infra notes 149-63 and accompanying text.
147 423 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Md. 1976).
148 Id. at 1048.
149 Although this Comment concludes that a state action requirement should
not be grafted onto the remaining clauses of § 1981, it should be recognized that
even with a state action requirement, the remaining clauses will have some efficacy
with regard to remedying acts of discrimination practiced by public employers.
150 See supra notes 26-28 & 58-62 and accompanying text.
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full and equal benefit and like punishment clauses. 151 Its reasoning
was that although the right to "make and enforce contracts" can be
infringed by private persons:
[t]he words full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property... suggest a concern with rela-
tions between the individual and the state, not between two indi-
viduals. . .it is only the state acting through its agents, not the
private individual, which is capable of denying to blacks the full and
equal benefit of the law.
152
Although a number of other lower federal courts have adopted
the conclusion of the Mahone court,'5 ' it is suspect for a number of
reasons. First, the issue of state action as required for an action
under the full and equal benefit clause was not before the court in
Mahone. The suit in Mahone was brought under § 1981 against police
officers for racially motivated police brutality. Whether the actions
of police officers constituted state action was not questioned; there-
fore, the court's statements with regard to state action were unneces-
sary to support its conclusion.
Furthermore, the Mahone court did not engage in an extensive
151 See Mahone, 564 F.2d at 1029 ("[T]he concept of state action is implicit in the
equal benefit clause. The like punishment clause may be read in the same way.").
152 Id. One commentator has noted that these implications drawn from the
language of § 1981 are not as clear as the Mahone court suggests:
Accepting the premise that the state is the sole source of law does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that only the state can deprive a citizen of
the equal benefit of the laws. A government may establish "laws and
proceedings" that are fair as between all citizens, but a private individual
can interfere with this equality so as to prevent another from enjoying the
full and equal benefit of those laws. Rights created between individuals
and the federal government necessarily entail a corresponding
"obligation of private parties not to interfere with the receipt of benefits
under the individual's relationship with the state."
Comment, supra note 54, at 138 (quoting Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Fore-
word: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91,
113 (1966)).
153 See, e.g., Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 785 F.2d 523, 525-26 (4th Cir.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 615 (1987); Chiles v. Crooks, 708 F. Supp. 127,
132 (D.S.C. 1989); Thompson v. Wise General Hospital, 707 F. Supp 849, 853 (W.D.
Va. 1989); Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 104, 109 (D.D.C. 1985). Shaare Tefila,
beyond quoting the reasoning given in Mahone set forth in the text, provided no
reason for limiting the protection of the full and equal benefit clause to state action.
See Shaare Tefila, 785 F.2d at 526. The remaining cases concluding that state action
was required under the full and equal benefits clause merely cited either Shaare Tefila
or Mahone without attempting any independent analysis of the applicability of the
relevant clauses of § 1981.
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analysis, perhaps because the issue was not central to its decision. Its
discussion was restricted to the language of the statute without refer-
ence to legislative history or precedent.' 54 Even its analysis of the
language of the statute, however, is not entirely convincing. No lan-
guage in § 1981 limits any of its clauses to state action, and where
Congress has wished to limit the reach of a statute to state action in
the past, it has clearly done so.' 5 5 Furthermore, the type of conduct
sought to be prohibited by Congress in enacting the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 extended to many private injustices such as assaults on
blacks.' 5 6 Finally, the language of the full and equal benefit clause in
§ 1981 is similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 157 With this similarity in
mind, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 158 sup-
ports a conclusion that § 1981 covers private acts of discrimination:
[T]here is nothing inherent in the phrase ["a deprivation of the
equal protection of the laws"] that requires the action working the
deprivation to come from the State. Indeed, the failure to mention
any such requisite can be viewed as an important indication of con-
gressional intent to speak in § 1985(3) of all deprivations of "equal
protection of the laws" and "equal privileges and immunities
under the laws," whatever their source.
159
The language of § 1981, its legislative history, and Supreme
Court precedent support the conclusion that state action should not
be required to support a claim under any of the clauses of § 1981.
154 See Hawk v. Perillo, 642 F. Supp. 380, 390 (N.D. 111. 1985) (criticizing the
analysis in Mahone).
155 For examples of statutes in which Congress specifically intended to restrict
their scope to state action, see 18 U.S.C.§ 242 (1988) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982),
both of which require the prohibited actions to be taken "under color of" law.
156 See Hawk, 642 F. Supp. at 390; see also supra notes 35-42 and accompanying
text (discussing the various private acts of discrimination following the Civil War).
157 See Hawk, 642 F. Supp. at 392. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1982) states that:
If two or more persons in an) State or Territory conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the
constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to
all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws;
... if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any
act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy .... the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Id.
158 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
159 Id. at 97 (citation omitted).
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These factors were expressly considered by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Hawk v. Perillo, 6 0 which
held that state action was not required to support a claim under the
full and equal benefit clause.16' The case involved a suit brought by
two black plaintiffs against a group of white assailants and the police
officers who failed to detain the assailants effectively after the assault.
With regard to the police defendants, the question of state action
was not an issue on appeal; the private defendants argued, however,
that they could not be liable to the plaintiffs under the full and equal
benefit clause because they did not act under color of the law. 162
Expressly rejecting Mahone and relying on the aforementioned fac-
tors, the court concluded that the full and equal benefit clause
reaches private acts of discrimination.' 63
3. The Full and Equal Benefit Clause Applied to Employment
Discrimination
As already discussed, the full and equal benefit clause has been
applied to provide a recovery to compensate victims for the psycho-
logical distress of police brutality. An employer's continual harass-
ment of an employee may produce similar distress. Discriminatory
demotions, promotions, terminations, and training clearly deny
minorities an equal opportunity for gainful employment. Such dep-
160 642 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
161 See id. at 388-92.
162 See id. at 383, 389.
163 See id at 392. In Carey v. Rudeseal, 703 F. Supp. 929 (N.D. Ga. 1988), the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia concluded that the
full and equal benefit clause did not require state action and provided a cause of
action for a racially motivated assault by the Ku Klux Klan. See id. at 930 & n. I. A
number of other cases have also concluded that the full and equal benefit clause does
not require state action. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 755 (D.
Or. 1973) (holding that a rule against speaking Spanish in a privately owned bar
violated both the full and equal benefit clause and the contract clause of § 1981, as
well as § 1982 because it "deprive[d] Spanish-speaking persons of their rights to buy,
drink and enjoy what the tavern ha[d] to offer on an equal footing with English-
speaking consumers"); Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240, 1244-45 (E.D. Mo.
1969) (finding that the interference of a private black organization with the services
of a white church "denied plaintiffs of their right to hold property and to have it
protected as is guaranteed by [the full and equal benefit clause of § 1981]"), aff'd on
other grounds, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Central Presbyterian Church v. Black
Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894, 901 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (also finding no need for
state action under the full and equal benefit clause when a private black organization
disrupted a white church service).
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rivations are likely to lead to a psychological belief by minorities that
they are inferior to the favored group.'
6 4
These effects constitute a very real concern given that an
employee's sense of purpose, status, and well-being are closely
related to her job.' 6 5 Employees continually harassed and degraded
by unfair and discriminatory employment practices are denied an
opportunity to express themselves meaningfully through their work.
For most employees, "[w]orking gives them a feeling of being tied
into the larger society, of having something to do, of having a pur-
pose in life."' 166 As eloquently expressed by Justice Douglas in his
dissent to Barsky v. Board of Regents: 1
67
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious lib-
erty that man possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as
he has to live, to be free, to own property. The American ideal was
stated by Emerson in his essay on Politics, "A man has a right to be
employed, to be trusted, to be loved, to be revered." It does many
men little good to stay alive and free and propertied, if they cannot
work. To work means to eat. It also means to live. For many it
would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle on the curb. The
great values of freedom are in the opportunities afforded man to
press to new horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of
nature, to match skills with his fellow man.'
6 8
Although Justice Douglas's view did not prevail in Barsky, the
Court has long recognized that the Constitution protects the right to
work in one's chosen profession free of discrimination. For example,
in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' 69 the Court found that the discriminatory
enforcement of a local ordinance through refusing permits to oper-
ate laundries to Chinese applicants constituted a deprivation of
equal protection. In reaching its decision, the Court proclaimed that
"the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of
164 Cf Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (finding that in
the context of public education racial segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority"
on the part of minorities "in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
165 See G. STRAUSS & L. SAYLES, PERSONNEL: THE HUMAN PROBLEMS OF
MANAGEMENT 21 (3d ed. 1972).
166 Morse & Weiss, The Function and Meaning of Work and the Job, AM. Soc. REV.,
Apr. 1955, at 191, 191.
167 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
168 Id. at 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Although the statement was made
in a dissent, in light of subsequent Court decisions, it now probably represents the
prevailing view. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-13, at 1376 (2d
ed. 1988).
169 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any coun-
try where freedom prevails."
' 170
As demonstrated by Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 171 modem court
decisions have continued to value the right to work.' 72 In Hampton,
the Court concluded that a Civil Service Commission rule barring all
noncitizens from employment in the federal competitive civil service
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The deci-
sion was premised upon the rationale that the exclusion of aliens
from employment in the civil service was "of sufficient significance to
be characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty." 173
The extension to the full and equal benefit clause of the Court's
protection of the right to work, as formulated under the equal pro-
tection clause, follows naturally from the parallel nature of the full
and equal benefit clause of § 1981 and the equal protection clause.
In fact, in considering a statute making it illegal for corporations to
hire Chinese employees, the court in In re Parrott, 174 applied the
same analysis under both § 1977 of the Revised Statutes and the
equal protection clause.1 75 Basing its reasoning upon the fourteenth
amendment, the contract clause and the full and equal benefit clause
of § 1977, the court concluded that the statute was void because "to
deprive a man of the right to select and follow any lawful occupa-
tion-that is, to labor, or contract to labor, if he so desires and can
find employment-is to deprive him of both liberty and
property."'76
Although Parrott highlights the similarity between the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the full and equal
benefit clause, it does not discuss the primary difference.between the
two. Because Parrott involved a statute that prevented the employ-
ment of Chinese workers, state action was not an issue. As already
noted, the full and equal benefit clause is not limited in the same way
170 Id. at 370.
171 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
172 See also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957)
(holding that a state deprived the plaintiff of liberty without due process of the law
when it denied him admission to the bar on the basis of former membership in the
Communist Party); Van Zandt v. McKee, 202 F.2d 490, 491 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding
that "[t]he right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, includes the right to
work and earn an honest living"); L. TRIBE, supra note 168, § 15-13, at 1308-12
(providing a general discussibn of the protection that the Supreme Court has
afforded the right to employment).
173 Hampton, 426 U.S. at 102.
174 1 F. 481 (C.C.D. Cal. i880).
175 See id. at 510.
176 Id.
1990] 1241
1242 UNIVERSITY OF PENATSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:1209
as the fourteenth amendment to a prohibition of state action depriv-
ing citizens of equal protection. 1" Given Congress's power to
determine which private actions constitute badges and incidents of
slavery and to pass laws to abolish them,1 78 the constitutionality of a
statute that operates as would the equal protection clause without
the state action limitation is clear; however, little case law applies the
right to work analysis to private action under the full and equal bene-
fit clause. Vietnamese Fishermen's Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, 179 suggests such an approach. In that case, the Ku Klux Klan
embarked upon a course of violence and threatened violence to dis-
courage Vietnamese fishermen from participating in the shrimping
season. Noting that § 1981 "protects a panoply of individual rights,
the primary one being the right to contract to earn a living,"' 80 the
court suggested that the full and equal benefit clause as well as the
contract clause would be implicated by the Klan's conduct, in effect
indicating that the right to earn a living in one's chosen occupation is
protected against discriminatory private action.'
8 '
Once it is recognized that the full and equal benefit clause of
§ 1981 protects the right to labor in one's chosen occupation, any
discriminatory action on the part of an employer that prevents an
employee from engaging in his chosen occupation should be prohib-
ited, even if such action constitutes postformation conduct.'
8 2
177 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
178 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-41 (1968).
179 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
180 Id. at 1008.
181 See id. The court indicated that it is well established that the full and equal
benefit clause applies to private action although it noted that the Third Circuit found
a state action requirement in Mahone, 564 F.2d at 1029-30. The court appeared to
reject the approach of Mahone, but refused to take a definitive stand on the issue and
found the actions of the Klan to be prohibited by the contract clause. See Vietnamese
Fisherman's Ass'n, 518 F. Supp. at 1009. After Patterson, it is not clear that the conduct
of the Klan would be covered by the contract clause.
182 A different approach from that outlined in the text to achieve coverage of
much postformation behavior by the full and equal benefit clause of § 1981 concerns
the protection of associational rights, which has been provided in the past under
§ 1981. For example, in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431
(1973), the Court upheld a cause of action for white plaintiffs in the absence of a
tangible injury. The plaintiffs belonged to a private swim club that refused to admit
their black guest. Unlike similar plaintiffs in an earlier case before the Court, Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), the plaintiffs in Tillman suffered no
direct injury as they were not expelled from the club. Despite the absence of a direct
injury, the Court upheld the cause of action under §§ 1981 and 1982 both for the
white plaintiffs and the black plaintiffs whose applications for membership had been
rejected. See Tillman, 410 U.S. at 4-38-39.
Taking a similar approach in an employment case, the District Court of
LOST CLAUSES OF SECTION 1981
Racially motivated harassment limits an employee's enjoyment of her
chosen occupation. If an employer promotes, demotes, or termi-
nates an employee because of her race, such action makes her status
dependent upon her race. If training is provided or denied because
of an employee's race, that employee cannot excel to the same extent
as an employee of the favored racial group. All of these postforma-
tion discriminatory actions deprive an employee of her right to work
unaffected by the arbitrary effects of racial discrimination and are
likely to be motivated by a desire to encourage a minority member to
abandon her chosen occupation.
Such behavior was found to be actionable under § 1981 in
Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore. 183 In that case, four black employees of
the city fire department brought suit against the mayor and city
council for a variety of discriminatory practices, including segrega-
tion, harassment, and ostracism.'" 4 These practices led to a lower
promotion rate among black employees than their white counter-
parts within the fire department. Noticing psychiatric testimony
presented at the trial, the court concluded that the "frustrations and
cruelties of racial discrimination" likely led to the high attrition rate
of blacks within the fire department and such practices were, there-
fore, actionable under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment and § 1981.'5
Notably, the Patterson Court did not consider the full and equal
benefit clause in holding that Brenda Patterson was not entitled to an
award under § 1981 for her employer's racial harassment. In light of
Patterson's holding that § 1981 applies to private conduct, the full and
equal benefit clause should be applied to deter racially motivated pri-
vate discrimination. The Court's decision was premised upon an
Connecticut held in National Organization for Women v. Sperry Rand Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 1338 (D. Conn. 1978), that white employees had standing to press a § 1981
action against their employer because of the employer's discrimination against
blacks. See id. at 1344-47. The statutory basis of these decisions is difficult to
ascertain, because it does not appear that the plaintiffs were alleging any interference
with their own right to make and enforce contracts. One commentator, noting the
lack of a contractual basis for the plaintiffs' claim, concluded that the Speny Rand
court inferred a right to an integrated workplace from the full and equal benefit
clause of § 1981. See Comment, supra note 54, at 146-47. In reaching that
conclusion, the commentator pointed to thd characterization of the plaintiffs' injury
in Speny Rand as a "'loss of associational benefits.'" Id. (quoting Speny Rand, 457 F.
Supp. at 1345, 1347).
183 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md.) modified sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d
1134 (4th Cir. 1973).
184 See id. at 1194-95.
185 See id. at 1195.
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analysis of the precise language of the contract clause. It found that
the clause's protection of the right to make contracts is limited to
behavior occurring at the time of a contract's formation. No such
limitation is apparent in the full and equal benefit clause.
C. The Like Punishment Clause
As discussed above, the like punishment clause often is impli-
cated along with the full and equal benefit clause in police miscon-
duct cases.' 86 Its scope in cases not involving state action is,
however, even more uncertain than that of the full and equal benefit
clause. Although the Mahone court found that "[o]nly the state
imposes or requires 'taxes, licenses, and exactions' and the maxim
noscitur a sociis suggests that the 'punishment, pains [and] penalties'
to which the clause refers are those imposed by the state,"' 8 7 such an
interpretation defies the legislative history of the statute.' The
phrase "punishment, pains and penalties," was enacted as part of the
original act in 1866.189 The phrase "taxes, licenses, and exactions"
was added when the statute was reenacted in 1870.190 Because the
phrase "taxes, licenses, and exactions" was not in the original stat-
ute, limiting the scope of the statute by making reference to that
phrase is illogical. The terms were adopted to expand the reach of
the statute, not to restrict it. 9 ' Section 1981 was passed to eliminate
the vestiges of slavery. In a world accustomed to slavery, the state
was not the only source of punishment.
The modem workplace is not free of unequal punishments. In
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 192 the petitioners, who
were white, were discharged for stealing cargo, but a black employee
was not discharged for the same offense. 9 ' The Court was not
asked to decide whether such unequal and discriminatory punish-
ment was actionable under § 1981. Instead, it was asked to deter-
mine whether or not § 1981 could protect whites as well as
minorities."9 4 In holding that the statute "explicitly applies to 'all
186 See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
187 Mahone, 564 F.2d at 1029-30.
188 See Comment, supra note 54, at 158-59.
189 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 144 (codified version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982)).
190 See Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 144 (codified version
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1982)).
191 See Comment, supra note 54, at 159.
192 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
193 See id. at 275-76.
194 See id. at 285-86.
LOST CLAUSES OF SECTION 1981
persons' including white persons," it assumed that the contract
clause would apply.
95
After Patterson, it is not clear whether such discrimination would
be prohibited by the contract clause. Firing a person for stealing
does not implicate the initial formation of the contract and, there-
fore, is probably not actionable under the contract clause. The like
punishment clause, however, expressly provides that all persons are
to be subject to like punishment regardless of race. An employer's
discriminatory firing of an employee clearly violates the like punish-
ment clause by denying the employee the right to labor in her chosen
profession without regard to her race.196 Nevertheless, despite
numerous cases in which employees have been discriminatorily fired
as punishment, courts have not focused on the like punishment
clause as the source of the relief. 97
Firing an employee is a drastic punishment in that the employer
can no longer benefit from the labor relationship. Less drastic pun-
ishments allowing the employer to continue to benefit from the labor
of the employee may also be imposed in a discriminatory manner.
For instance, an employer may decrease an employee's pay, impose a
monetary fine, reprimand the employee, or place her on probation
subject to immediate discharge. Any of these lesser punishments, if
imposed in a racially discriminatory manner, also violate § 1981. For
example, in Nichelson v. Quaker Oats Co., 198 the plaintiff, a black
employee, alleged that she was discriminatorily punished on two
195 Id. at 287.
196 See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
one's right to labor in one's chosen profession free of discrimination).
197 See, e.g., Abasiekong v. City of Shelby, 744 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (4th Cir.
1984) (concluding that the jury could have found for a black plaintiff under § 1981
who was fired for using city resources for his personal use when no action was taken
against white employees who committed the same offense); Manzanares v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979) (recognizing relief under § 1981 by
expanding the definition of "race" to include ethnic groups such as Hispanics);
Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 (8th Cir. 1975) (although not
specifying the clause of § 1981 on which it was relying, finding a cause of action
where black employee was "discharged, in part, for being absent from work while
white employees with similar or identical attendance records received only written
warnings or a 'second chance' ").
198 573 F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Tenn. 1983), rev'd, 752 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir.),
vacated, 472 U.S. 1004 (1985). The Sixth Circuit did not reach any questions of law in
its opinion. It held that the fact findings of the district court were clearly erroneous
on the record presented. In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent remand based
upon the improper treatment of the factual findings by the Court of Appeals, the
discussion in the text assumes that the fact findings, namely that the punishment of
the plaintiff was motivated by racial discrimination, were proper.
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occasions. First, she claimed that her demotion for failing to finish
work assigned to her was racially motivated.1 9 9 A white employee
who was also responsible for completing the work but failed to do so
was not demoted. In the second instance, the plaintiff received a two
day suspension for overstating her hours on her time sheet.
20 0
White employees were not suspended for similar conduct. Although
not specifying the clause of § 1981 on which it relied, the district
court expressly found that these two instances of discriminatory pun-
ishment violated § 198 1.201
Punishments such as those visited upon the plaintiff in Nichelson
involve situations in which the employee will possibly be subject to
further discrimination. Such punishments are likely to be used to
force minority employees to resign, which would have the same
effect as discriminatory discharges. 20 2 In addition, discriminatory
punishments enhance an employer's power over an employee and
are reminiscent of the arbitrary control exercised by slaveowners
over a century ago. It is unthinkable that such treatment be tolerated
in today's workplace. The like punishment clause provides a remedy
for an employee subjected to such discriminatory punishments.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Patterson was premised on a literal inter-
pretation of that part of § 1981 guaranteeing the right to "make and
enforce" contracts free of discrimination. Although it concluded
that a wide range of discriminatory conduct fell outside of the con-
tract clause, the Court did not consider the evidence, full and equal
benefit, or like punishment clauses. These clauses have never been
presented to the Court for consideration. Courts and litigants
attempting to apply Patterson must recognize the limited scope of.the
Court's holding. Although Patterson is consistent with the wording of
the contract clause, the long neglected clauses of § 1981 provide sig-
nificant additional protections.
199 See id. at 1215-21.
200 See id. at 1221-24.
201 See id. at 1221 (finding that the plaintiff's demotion violated § 1981 in that it
was in stark contrast to the treatment of a white employee); id. at 1224 (a violation of
§ 1981 occurred when the plaintiff, "a black woman ... was selected for punishment
by suspension for two days for an alleged offense for which no other employee in the
plant was punished").
202 See id. at 1230 (stating that, in the court's opinion, the purpose of
discrimination in Nichelson was to eliminate her from the plant work force and "to
make an example of her as a warning to other black employees").
